Marketing activities are introduced into a rational-expectations model of the food-marketing system. The extended model is used to evaluate the effects of alternative ~umptions about technology in food -marketing on the distribution of the benefits derived from the provision of contingency markets in agriculture. These benefits are shown to depend crucially on the values of two parameters: the cost-share of farm inputs and the elasticity of substitution between farm and nonfarm inputs in the production of retail-food products. For a broad spectrum of technologies, consumers arc likely to be the net beneficiaries and farmers the net losers from the provision of contingency markets.
Marketing-System Equilibrium in the Absence or Contingency Markets
For the purpose of comparisons with Myers' results we retain the basic s1ructure of the original model. We modify it, however, in order to distinguish between the respective information sets conditioning the expectations of farmers, consumers , and food-marketers. An appealing way to do this is to consider the temporal sequence of deci sionmaking in the absence of futures and insurance markets: 2 At time "t-1" farmers make quantity decisions about the level of resources to devote to the production of a particular commodity. the output and price of which are revealed at time " t" . During this latter period, after the price and output are known , marketing agents make input decisions based on their desired levels of production of a retail-food product The latter is consumed at time "t+l" and, hence, at time " t" marlceters face random demand. 3 In the farm sector we retain the assumptions of the original model. 4 Specifically, we assume that (a) farmers are identical; (b) technology exhibits multiplicative uncertainty; (c) production is homogeneous of degree ( l+o)/o, where o e [0,+oo) ; (d) preferences exhibit constant relative aversion to risk of degree a e (0,+oo); and (e) farm consumption is distributed log-normally and jointly with the price of the farm commodity and the random factor in farm production. Using lower-case letters to denote logarithms (i.e., v • lOSe,(V)), we define t-jVt+i as the conditional expectation at time "t-j" of the random variable v, the value of which is realized in period "t+i" .
Applying this notation to the first-order condition of a representative finn, we make use of properties of the lognormal distribution (e.g., Johnson and Kotz , to derive a time-dependent version of Myers' farmcommodity supply function . This has the specific form:
(I) Yft = oCt-lPft -h0 + t-10t + 1.1<111-a t-1<12tl + 9t.
where Yf and Pf denote, respectively, the logarithms of ouiput and the price of the farm commodity, hO is the log of the price-dependent component of the farm-production cost function, 0 is the random variable that affects farm output, and <11 and <12 are functions of conditional expectations terms. 5
In the marketing sector we introduce the following assumptions: (a) agents are identical, (b) they minimize the cost of producing any given level of output, (c) technology is nonstochastic with constant rctums-to-scale,6 (d) preferences exhibit constant relative aversion to risk of degreeµ e (0,+oo), and (e) nwketing-agents' consumption is distributed log-normally and jointly with the price of the retail producL Combining these assumptions with the first-order condition of a representative agent's maximization problem and applying Shcphard's lemma. we obtain a derived demand function for the farm commodity:
and an implicit supply function for the retail product:
In these expressions Yr and Pr denote the logarithms of output and price of the retail product, Pm is the log of the price of nonfarm inputs used in retail-food production, 03 corresponds to a function of conditional expectations terms,7 and t and w have been defined previously. The cost function implicit in the right-hand side of (3) has the generalized Cobb-Douglas form . There exists an exact correspondence between this specification and the derived demand function on the right-hand side of (2) only in the specific case where t = -1. Since this assumption is problematic for modelling food-marketing behavior, we use the more general specification implicit in (2), noting its local consistency with the specification in (3) when the variables in both equations are expressed in proportionalchange terms. 8
Consumer behavior is represented by a retail-demand function for the food product. We invoke Myers' specification: (4) where z denotes a vector of random effects that are assumed to be jointly log-nonnally distributed; ao and a1 are fixed parameters; and ;, which is also assumed to be constant throughout the range of the comparative-static experiments, denotes the elasticity of demand for the retail product Equations (l)-(4), implicitly define a rational-expectations equilibrium in the food-marketing system when there are no contingency markets available. We characterize this equilibrium through a set of reduced-form expressions for the prices and quantities of the farm commodity and the retail product. namely: Pf•, yr*. Pr•. and y/.9 The method of solution is analogous to that of Myers. Our temporal formulation requires, in addition, that we apply the law of iterated expectations, namely that for integers ks j s i. one has: H<t-jV 1 .k) • t-iVt-k·
The Comparative-Static Effects or the Provision or Ideal Contingency Markets Consider marketing-system equilibrium in the presence of two additional markets: one that is stale-contingent in the output of the farm commodity-an insurance market-and another that is swe contingent in its pri<»-a futures market. Myers shows that when these markets are "ideal " in the sense that (a) the futures price equals lhe expectation of the future spot price for lhe farm commodity, and (b) insurance premiums are actuarially fair so that they equal the expected payout from the scheme, risk averse fanners f uJly insure their output on the insurance market and fully hedge their insured output on the futures market. This behavior, which is shown lo be consistent wi lh expected profit maximization , yields an alternative specification of the fann commodity supply function:
The difference between this specification and the one that appears as equation ( 1) is the absence of the term -<lt-l 02t·
As noted by Myers, this term is a function of fixed parameters and is nonpositive. Hence, the net effect of granting fanners access to contingency markets is a shift downwards in their supply function by a magnitude given by the value of the expression o· 1 at-l<l2t· One expects, therefore, that equilibrium prices will be lower and equilibrium quantities will be higher in the contingency-markets regime. Of course, this logic is reasonable only if equations (2)- (4) remain unaffected by the introduction of the new markets. Indeed, we invoke this case by asswning that consumers and marketers do not trade on risk markets. We note, however, that when marketing agents trade on the futures market. both the derived demand for the farm commodity-equation (2}-and the implicit supply fWlCtion for the retail product-equation (3}-will change in a manner that leads to ambiguous effects on output 10
The system depicted by equations (l ') and (2)-(4) implicitly defines a rational-expectations equilibrium when ideal contingency markets are available. As before, we characterize this equilibrium through a set of reduced-form expressions: pf, y f, Pr 0 , and yr 0 • Interest lies in the differences of the moments of these random variables between the two regimes. Thus, define v as the logarithmic difference in the mean of V (i.e., v • l<>geE {V 0 ) -l<>geE{v•)) and define erv 2 as the logarithmic difference in the variance (i.e., av 2 • lo&e Var { V 0 ) -l<>se Var { v• )). Using properties of the log-nonnal disuibution, we derive the following expressions for the changes in these moments between the two regimes: In the above expressions the symbol <t>, (9) defines a common, comparative-static effect. It is the marketing-system analog of the common term that appears in Myers' original comparative-static expressions (equations (14) and (15). p. 259). The difference between the two representations is the presence of the parameter e in place of the retail demand elasticity ,~. The epsilon term ,
defines the magniwde of the reduced-form , derived demand elasticity facing the farm sector. It is a weighted average of the elasticities of retail -demand and input-substitution in marketing, where the weights are given by the cost shares of farm and nonfarm inputs. Hence, e defines a linear combination of a subs1i1u1io11 effect, (1-<i>)'t, and an expa11Sio11 effect, we;, each of which is nonpositive. Given the signs of the remaining parameters, it follows that <t> is nonpositive. Thus the means and variances of prices are lower and the means and variance of quantities are higMr in the contingency-markets regime. While these results merely generalize the findings of Myers', equations (5)- (10) enable us to ascertain the robustness of the latter to assumptions about technology in the marketing industries.
Setting ro = l in (5)-(10), we observe that Myers' model is consistent with a situation in which farm-commodity costs completely exhaust expenditures by food marketers. In this case, the changes in the moments of prices and quantities are the same at both the farm and retail levels, and we may appropriately revert to Myer's representation. This is restrictive, however, because several of the major food industries depart substantially from this specific condition.11 When these departures occur, both the cost share parameter, ro, and the elasticity of substitution, t, influence the magnirudes of price and quantity adjustments and, hence, the distribution of the benefits derived from the provision of contingency marlcets in agriculture. The remainder of this paper is devoted to deriving these effects.
Welfare Computation
In the context of equations (5)- (8) a direct application of the results in Myers' appendix yields the following expression for the proportional change in consumer welfare that occurs with the introduction of contingency markets:
-swheres is the share of the representative consumer's income that is spent on the food item, R is her coefficient of relative ris.k aversion, Tl is her income-elasticity of demand, and CV(Pr) is the coefficient of variation in the retail price in the absence of contingency markets. Since 't and w both affect the value of <l>, it is clear from the above expression that both the cost-share parameter and the substitution elasticity affect consumer benefiis. Although the actual sign of these benefits is ambiguous, ilS magnitude is monotonic in the value of the multiplicative term w<t>.
To calculate the effect on farm welfare, Myers uses an approximation whereby the impact of cost changes on consumption expenditures in farming are ignored. This procedure is rationalized on the grounds that these effeclS are likely to be small relative lo the impact of changes in farm revenues. However, in the very short run, with asset fixity in agriculture (0~8), these cost changes can be shown to be substantial; in particular cases, they may overwhelm the effects of changes in farm revenues. In the long run, with free entry and exit from farming (o~oo+), the cost change must be approximately proportional to the change in output that occurs as a result of the movement to the new equilibrium. These issues warrant reformulation of the expression for the change in farm welfare. When changes in costs are accounted for, this reformulation yields:
where Cf denotes the proportional change in farm-consumption expenditures that results from the inb'Oduction of contingency markets, CV(Cr) is the coefficient of variation in these expenditures in the absence of these markets,~ is the ratio of farm revenues to farm-consumption expenditures, and JC is the ratio of fann costs to Cann-consumption expenditures. The difference between the above expression and the one derived by Myers (equation (16) , p. UiO) is the presence of the term -<l>lCE(l +o)/o in the expression for the proportional change in mean farm-<:onsumpcion expenditures. Since 4> and E are nonpositive and 1C and o are nonnegative it follows that fann welfare will be lower when the effect of cost changes are accounted for. Accounting for these effects leads to new conditions that are sufficient to ensure that farmers gain from trading on contingency markets. In particular, we note that whenever the cost-share parameter is nonnegligible, neither Myers' condition-an elastic demand for the food product-nor its multi-market counterpart-an elastic derived demand for the farm commodity-are sufficient to ensure that farmers
gain.
An important effect that is unobservable in Myers' framework is the impact that contingency markets have on the welfare of agents in the marketing sector. Using Taylor-series approximations (Newbery and Stiglitz, 198 l ,  p.93), we derive the following expression for the proponional change in marketing-agent welfare:
In this expression Cm denotes the proportional change in consumption expenditures in the marketing sector. and ~CV(Cm)2 is a tenn that reflects the relative change in the variance in thc;, se expenditures between the two regimes.12 Since the sign of this expression cannot be detennined a priori, liule can be said about the overall impact of this tenn on marketing-agent welfare. In contrast, the mean consumption effect is positive when retail demand is elastic and negative when demand is inelastic. Its exact magnitude depends on the specific values of the technology parameters that appear in the multiplicative lenn w<t>.
In summary, both the cost share parameter and the substitution elasticity affect the distribution of welfare between each of the market participants, but the precise effects are ambiguous. In order to detennine the likely directions and magnitudes of these effects we perform the numerical experiments discussed below.
Numerical Results
Table l presents the information used to implement the experiments. Most of the reported parameter values correspond to those used by Myers. However, the introduction of a marketing sector requires some additional assumptions and other modifications to be made.
First, in the interests of space, only the case of high risk is considered. Second, since the long-run situation is, arguably, the more relevant one for policy analysis, the experiments are conducted under the IWWJlption of constant returns-to-scale in farming. Third, accounting for farm costs ncccssiwes estimating the ratio of these costs to farm-consumption expenditures. If one assumes that receipts from off-fann income are negligi'ble then the relationship ic • ~-1 can be used to assign a value to K . A fourth modification concerns the appropriate value to use for the coefficient of variation in retail price in computing the change in consumer welfare. In Myers' framewak (CJ) = 1) the means and variances of the logarithms of farm and retail prices are identical. Hence, for current purposes, it is natural to consider the case where the coefficients of variation in fann and retail prices are the same.13 A fifth matter concerns the appropriate values to assign to the parameterµ and the statistic !!.CV(Cm)2, which appear in the -7 -expression for I.he marketing agent's welfare change. The latter statistic reflects I.he change in I.he variability in marketing profits I.hat occurs between the two regimes. Since these profits are defined over farm and retail prices and I.he quantity at retail, it reflects the combined effects of the changes implied in equations (5). (7) and (8). Since price variability decreases. while output variability increases. it is reasonable to assume that I.he net effect of th is tenn is negligible. We therefore ignore I.he effects of the second term on I.he right-hand side of equation (13) and foc us only on I.he mean consumption effect. 1 4 Given I.he magnitude assumed for I.he retail -demand elasticity I.he sign of th is remaining term is positive.
We summarize the results of I.he simulations in the three diagrams I.hat appear in figure l. These depict I.he welfare changes over I.he two-dimensional space defined by I.he domains of the marketing-technology parameters.
namely w e [0, l) and t e [-1 ,0). The results confirm I.hat I.he cost-share parameter is crucial in affecting the incidence of I.he benefits and I.hat I.he elasticity of substitution also plays an important role. Specifically, the magnitudes of I.he benefits accruing to consumers and to marketers increases monotonically in I.he value of w. l 5
Although lhese specific relationships are determined independently of the value oft, the substitution elasticity does have a significant impact on the benefits accruing to I.he farm sector. In farm production the impact of t is felt indirectly, through changes in the value of the derived-demand elasticity.
Several olher observations are available from the results presented in figure 1 . 'The first is one that appears to be independent of assumptions made about technology in the marketing industries and confirms an important finding in Myer's previous work: Consumers are likely to be the net beneficiaries of the provision of contingency markets. Second, the direction of change in marketing-agent welfare is detennined solely by the value of the elasticity of demand for the retail product. This result is, of course, a direct consequence of the assumption that the second term on the right-hand side of (13) is negligible. In cases where this assumption is inappropriate it seems unlikely that the impact of the second tenn would be sufficient to overwhelm the impact of the firsL A third observation, which is perhaps the most significant one available from the figure, is that for a wide range of technologies in the marketing industry farm welfare declines as a result of the inttoduction of contingency mukets.
Under the assumed values for the parameters in table 1, the sufficient condition for farmers to gain is that the absolute value of I.he derived demand elasticity be greater than two. Hence, farmers are more likely to gain when derive-demand is highly elastic. This, in turn, depends on three effects: the magnitude of the demand elasticity at the retail level, the substitution possibilities available in production of the retail product. and the proportion of marketing costs attributed to purchases of the farm-commodity. When the absolute values of the latter two effects are small it is unlikely that the sufficient condition for farm gains will be met~ven when demand for the food product is elastic. Indeed. estimates of e: can be derived for several of the major food industries that suggest that the sufficient condition is not met, given the values of the other parameters in table t. 16 Whether the farm sector actually docs gain in these particular cases depends greatly on the degree of variability in farm-consumption expenditures that exists prior to the introduction of contingency markets. However, the results suggest that in either case the gains or losses that are incurred are likely to be small. Indeed, it appears that they are likely to be small in both absolute tenns as well as in relation to the value of farm output. 17
Concluding Comments
An imponant factor that is often neglected in analyses of food-marketing systems is the nature of technology in the marketing industries. The results of this study have extended those of Myers' wherein a restrictive assumption about these industries is implicit; namely, that farm commodity inputs account for total expenditures in food marketing.
In relaxing this assumption it is shown that technology in the marketing industries is a significant factor affecting the distribution of the benefits derived from the provision of contingency markets in agriculture. However, the more general framework presented in this paper reveals that an important finding of Myers remains robust Specifically, consumers are likely to be the net beneficiaries of the provision of contingency markets. In contrast, when the costshare parameter departs from the value one an elastic demand for the food product is no longer sufficient to ensure that farmers gain from the provision of these markets. For a wide range of values for the cost-share parameter and the elasticity of substitution in marketing, farmers are likely to lose surplus as a result of the introduction of risk markets.
More generally, this paper has considered the issue of introducing marketing behavior into a rationalexpectations model of the food system. It is shown tha1 this can be achieved in a tractable manner through a simple, two-equation extension of Myers' framework. As such, the extended model presented in this paper suffers the same limitations of the Conner model, including the assumptions of multiplicative uncertainty and constant relative aversion to risk. It is open to conjecture whether relaxing these assumptions is sufficient to overturn the findings presented herein. Future research should investigate this wue. I This is not surprising when one considers the size of the marketing industries in relation to that of the farm sector.
For example, in 1988 the marketing bill for domestic U.S. food products amounted to approximately seventy-five percent of the total value of expenditures on these products (USDA).
2 While this modification is not essential, a temporal view of transactions is preferred because it provides explicit account of the various uncertainties pertaining to each of the agents.
3we consider the random-demand case to be more realistic than its alternative, which can be handled with only slight modifications to the analysis.
4 One should note that several of the assumptions that follow are necessitated only by the need to derive numerical results. Many of the theoretical results upon which the model is founded are derived under a more general set of maintained hypotheses. For more detail see Myers (1986) .
5 Specifically:
t-lcrlt = t t-1 {(Pft -t-1Pr0 2 + (9t -t-190 2 + 2(Pft -t-1Pf0(0t-t-100). and t-1CJ2t. t-1 l<Pft -t-1Pf0(cft-t-1crt) + (9t -t-190(cft -1-1crt)} , where er denotes the logarithm of fann<ODSwnption expenditures.
6The constant-returns-to-scale assumption is made by convention (e.g., Gardner, Wohlgenant.. Holloway).
Marketing technologies tha1 are homogeneous of degrees less than one can be euily incorporated into the model.
7 Specifically, tCJ3t+l • t t{2µ(Prt+l -tPrt+1)(Cmt -t-lcmu + <Prt+l -tPn+1) 2 }, where cm denotes the logarithm of consumption expenditures in the marketing sector.
8 An often-maintained hypothesis for the marketing industries is that substitution possibilities between fann and nonfann inputs are negligible. While the presence or absence of substitution possibilities has been the subject of considerable debate (e.g., Alston and Scobie, Freebaim et al.) the available empirical evidence (Wohlgenant., table 3, p. 250) suggests that t = -1 is more likely to represent a lower bound.
-10 -9There are. in fact, five endogenous variables appearing in equations (1) 12 Specifically, this term is the change in the variance that results from the introduction of risk markets, divided by the square of mean consumption expenditures in the initial regime. Hence, it closely approximates the difference in the coefficients of variation when the means are similar between the two regimes.
13 A reviewer offers the intuitive expectation that the coefficient of variation at retail would be less than that at
farm. An interesting question is the condition under which this conjecture is correct. It holds true only in the case where there are no random shocks in retail demand. We establish this result from the reduced-Conn relationship between the logarithms of farm and retail prices; namely: Prt+l • = ai(z1+1 -tZt+l) + (1-Cl>)Pmt + t<13t+l + wprt.
Taking exponents, we obtain: Pr1+1 • = 'l'Prt•CI>, where 'I'• exp(a1(Zt+l -tZt+l) + (1-W)Pmt + t<13t+d· 1be latter term is nonrandom in the case where demand is deterministic (viz., tZt+l = Zt+1). Assuming this to be the case, we obtain an expression for the coefficient of variation at retail by applying a Taylor-series expansion (Mood et al., p. 
